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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY and 
HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) Case No. 15791 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and MICHAEL E. INSKEEP, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a review of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah, wherein 
it refused to reduce the award of defendant Michael E. Inskeep 
pursuant to Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The Industrial Commission of Utah denied plaintiffs' 
Motion for Review and affirmed the Order of the Administrative 
Law Judge. 
RELIEF SOVGHT BY PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs seek to set aside the award of the 
... 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Industrial Commission of Utah insofar as it fails to reduce 
the award of defendant Michael E. Inskeep pursuant to Section 
35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Michael E. Inskeep was working for 
plaintiff Interstate Electric Company on September 7, 1976, 
when his left foot slipped from a rung of a scaffold upon which 
he was climbing (R-28, 29 & 51). 
2. When his left foot slipped from the rung of the 
scaffold, defendant Inskeep experienced immediate pain and 
felt as if he had strained a muscle and twisted himself (R-
3. No one, to the knowledge of defendant Inskeep, 
witnessed the incident upon the scaffold. However, he did 
mention it to three fellow workers during his lunch break and I 
to his wife upon his return to his home (R-31, 32, 69, 77, 83 
& 86) . i 
4. Defendant Inskeep did not report the incident upon! 
I 
the scaffold to plaintiff Interstate Electric Company on 
September 7, 1976, because he thought that he 
his back (R-33). 
had just sprainel 
I 
5. Defendant Inskeep continued to work for approxi-
mately one (1) week following the incident upon the scaffold 
(R-35). 
- 2 -
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6. Defend~nt Inskeep reported the incident upon the 
scaffold to his supervisor on the morning of September 10, 
1976, approximately three (3) days after its occurrence (R-36 
& 5 2) . 
7. On the Thursday after the incident upon the scaf-
fold, the wife of defendant Inskeep, at his request, made an 
appointment to see Dr. Norman Beck (R-37). He saw Dr. Beck 
on September 13, 1976. Dr. Beck admitted him to the hospital 
and referred him to Dr. Peter M. Heilbrun (R-38 & 45). Dr. 
Heilbrun removed a disk between his fourth and fifth lumbar 
vertebrae and indicated in his histories that defendant In-
skeep had a history of low back and right leg pain and that, 
upon September 6, 1976, defendant Inskeep noted a gradual 
onset of more severe pain (R-44, 2 & 4). According to defen-
dant Inskeep, these histories are in error (R-67 & 68). 
8. Defendant Inskeep first experienced back pain 
when he was about seventeen (17) years of age. He experienced 
further back and leg pain in 1974. Thereafter, his back and 
leg pains recurred at intervals until the date of the incident 
upon the scaffold (R-46, 47, 48 & 49). 
9. The Administrative Law Judge who heard this matter 
determined, in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order. that while Section 35-1-99 might otherwise require a re-
duction in the compensation awarded to defendant Inskeep, 
-3-
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there was no showing of prejudice toward plaintiff Interstate 
Electric Company (R-203). Consequently, the Administrative 
Law Judge refused to reduce the award of defendant Inskeep 
in accordance with the provisions of Section 35-1-99 (R-203 
& 204). 
10. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Review, wherein 
they requested that the Administrative Law Judge who heard 
this matter reduce the award to defendant Inskeep by fifteen 
(15) percent (R-207 through 211). 
11. The Industrial Commission of Utah denied plain-
tiffs' Motion for Review and affirmed the Order of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge (R-214). 
ARGUMENT 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ERRED IN ITS FAIL-
URE TO REDUCE THE AWARD OF DEFENDANT MICHAEL E. 
INSKEEP PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-1-
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), AS AMENDED. 
Section 35-1-99 in pertinent part, states as follows: 
When an employee claiming to have suffered 
an injury in the service of his employer 
fails to give notice to his employer 
of the time and place where the accident 
and injury occurred, and of the nature 
of the same, within forty-eight (48) hours, 
when possible, or fails to report for medical 
treatment within said time, the compensa-
tion provided for herein shall be reduced 15 
percent; provided, that knowledge of such 
injury obtained from any source on the 
part of such employer, his managing 
-4-
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agent, superintendent, foreman or 
other person in authority, or know-
ledge of any assertion by the in-
jured sufficent to afford an oppor-
tunity to the employer to make- an 
investigation into the facts and 
to provide medical treatment shall 
be equivalent to such notice; and 
no defect or inaccuracy therein shall 
subject the claimant to such reduc-
tion, if there was no intention to 
mislead or prejudice the employer in 
making his defense, and the employer 
was not, in fact, so misled or pre-
judiced thereby. 
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 
436, 140 P.Zd 644 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court; speaking 
through Justice Wolfe, discussed the purpose and intent of 
the predecessor to Section 35-1-99. At pages 440 and 441, 
the Court stated: 
the cases uniformly hold that such 
statutes were designed to give the employer 
an opportunity to make an early investi-
gation of the circumstances surrounding 
the alleged accident and to assure 
him the opportunity of giving prompt and 
proper medical aid where it is deemed 
necessary. Such statutes also protect 
employers against fraudulent claims and 
give them an opportunity to remedy de-
fects so as to prevent similar accidents 
in the future. 
While the Court in the Salt Lake City case dealt with 
that portion of Section 35-1-99 which denies compensation 
to an employee who, claiming injury, fails to notify his em-
ployer of the accident and injury within one (1) year, its 
comments refer to the intent and purpose of the statute as a 
-5-
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whole. Consequently, the requirement that an employee who 
claims injury notify his employer of the accident and injury 
or report to his employer for medical treatment within 
forty-eight (48) hours is designed to enable the employer to 
make· early investigation of the alleged accident so as to 
foreclose fraudulent claims, afford an opportunity to the 
employer to provide prompt and proper medical aid to the 
employee, and to enable the employer to remedy any defects 
which may have caused the accident and injury so as to pre-
vent the occurrence of similar accidents and injuries. 
Further, the statutory requirement that the compensa· 
tion, if any, paid to an employee claiming injury be reduced 
fifteen (15) percent upon his failure to notify his employer 
of the alleged accident and injury or his failure to report 
to his employer for medical treatment within the forty-eight 
(48)-hour period subsequent to the alleged accident or injury 
provides a convenient means of redressing the prejudice which 
can result to an employer when an injured employee fails to 
notify him of the accident and injury or report to him for m~ 
i cal care as provided by the statute. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT INSKEEP NEITHER NOTIFIED PLAINTIFF INTER· 
STATE ELECTRIC COMPANY OF THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY 
NOR REPORTED TO IT FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT WITHIN THE 
TWE PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 35-1-99, UTAH CODE ANNO· 
TATED (1953), AS AMENDED. 
-6-
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As the language of Section 35-1-99 makes clear, an 
employee who claims to have suffered an injury in the ser-
vice of his employer must, within forty-eight (48) hours 
of the time of the alleged injury, (1) notify his employer 
of the nature of the accident and injury, the time and 
place of the accident, and the time and place of the injury, 
or, (2) report to his employer for medical treatment. Other-
wise, the compensation, if any, provided to him by the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act shall be reduced fifteen (15) 
percent. 
At the hearing of the matter at bar, defendant Inskeep 
testified that while the accident and injury occurred at ap-
proximately 11:00 a.m. on September 7, 1976, he did not re-
port the accident and injury to plaintiff Interstate Elec-
tric Company until the morning of September 10, 1976. Fur-
ther, he did not report to it for medical treatment within 
forty-eight (48) hours after the occurrence of the accident 
and injury and did not report anywhere for medical treatment 
until September 13, 1976. He has testified that his wife, 
at his request, made an appointment with Dr. Norman Beck on 
the Thursday after the occurrence of the accident and injury. 
However, he did not present any evidence at the hearing of 
this matter as to whether such appointment was made within 
forty-eight (48) hours of the occurrence of the accident and 
-7-
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injury. Further, the burden of producing such evidence was 
upon defendant Inskeep, as the Utah Supreme Court has indi-
cated in the case of Wherritt v. Industrial Commission, 100 
Utah 68, 110 P.Zd 374 (1941), which is set forth and dis-
cussed hereinafter at page 10. 
Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the making of 
the appointment with his physician constitutes a "report 
for medical treatment" on the part of defendant Inskeep, it 
is clear that such action on his part does not comport with 
the purpose and intent of Section 35-1-99, as set forth in 
the Salt Lake City case, for the following reasons. First, 
were an employee who claims injury required to report only 
to any medical practitioner for treatment, his employer likelvi 
would not receive notice of the alleged accident and injury I 
for some time, effectively denying the employer the opportu-
nities to investigate the alleged accident and injury and to 
remedy any defective condition which may have caused the j 
alleged accident and injury. Second, in the event the employe: 
claiming injury sees a practitioner who lacks the ability to 
properly treat the injury, the employer will be denied the 
opportunity to see that the employee gets proper, as well as 
prompt, medical care and mitigate the medical complications I 
which may otherwise result to the employee. Consequently, HI 
is clear that if an employee who claims injury does not repor, 
the accident and injury to his employer or report to his e~ 
-8-
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for medical treatment within forty-eight (48) hours, the 
intent and purpose of Section 35-1-99 will be frustrated. 
Consequently, as defendant Inskeep neither notified 
plaintiff Interstate Electric Company of the accident and 
injury nor reported to it for medical treatment within forty-
eight (48) hours after the occurrence of the accident and 
injury, the compensation provided to him by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act must be reduced fifteen (15) percent, un-
less otherwise provided by Section 35-1-99. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT INSKEEP HAS PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE INDICATING 
THAT PLAINTIFF INTERSTATE ELECTRIC C-OMPkW RECEIVED 
THE STATUTORY EQUIVALENT OF NOTICE, AS DEF!"!BD BY 
SECTION 35-1-99, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), AS 
AMENDED. 
In order to mitigate the result occasioned by the fail-
ure of an employee claiming injury to notify his employer 
of the accident and injury or report to his employer for medi-
cal treatment within the period prescribed by Section 35-1-99, 
it further provides that (1) knowledge of the injury obtained 
from any source on the part of the employer, his managing 
agent, his superintendent, foreman or other person in author-
ity or (2) knowledge of any assertion by the injured suffi-
cient to afford an opportunity to the employer to make an in-
vestigation into the facts and to provide treatment, shall 
satisfy the notice requirement of Section 35-1-99. 
-9-
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However, in the matter at bar, defendant Inskeep 
offered no testimony or other evidence which indicates that 
plaintiff Interstate Electric Company obtained knowledge of 
the injury from anyone, let alone the sources prescribed by 
Section 35-1-99, or that it had knowledge of any assertion 
made by him which would afford it the opportunity to make 
an investigation of the facts or provide medical treatment 
to him. Further, the burden of providing such evidence as 
is deemed by Section 35-1-99 to be the equivalent of actual 
notice to plaintiff Interstate Electric Company of the 
accident and injury is upon defendant Inskeep. In Wherritt 
vs. Industrial Commission, 100 Ut. 68, 110 P. 2d 374 ll94ll, 
the Utah Supreme Court spoke generally regarding the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof in workmen's compensation cases. 
There, at page 70, the Court stated: 
The burden of proof is upon applicant to 
establish her claim for compensation. 
Higley vs. Ind_ Comm., 75 Ut. 361, 285 
P. 306; Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop, 59 
Ut. 306, 203 P. 644. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never dealt with. the 
specific question of whether a claimant in a workmen's com-
pensation case has the burden of proof regarding the ques-
tion of whether his employer has received the statutory 
-10-
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equivalent of actual notice. However, 83 AmJur. 2d 220 sets 
forth the general rule in this regard. There, Section 456 
states: 
As a general rule, the burden is upon the 
applicant to show that notice of injury was 
given within the proper time, or, if there 
was delay in giving or failure to give the 
notice, to show that such delay or failure 
was due to mistake or other reasonable 
cause, that the employer or his representa-
tive had knowledge thereof, or that the 
want of notice has not prejudiced the 
employer. 
The record in the case at bar contains no indication 
whatsoever that defendant Inskeep has even attempted to 
show that plaintiff Interstate Electric Company obtained 
knowledge of his alleged accident and injury from any source, 
let alone those prescribed by Section 35-1-99, or that plain-
tiff Interstate Electric Company had knowledge of an asser-
tion by defendant Inskeep which would allow it to investi-
gate the facts and provide medical treatment to him. Con-
sequently, he has not only failed to meet his burden in this 
regard, but he has not even tried to do so. As the record 
details, defendant Inskeep told only three fellow employees 
and his wife about his claimed accident and injury. There is 
no indication in the record that his wife told plaintiff 
-11-
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Interstate Electric Company or any of its agents about the 
accident and injury. Further, while he told the three fellow 
employees about the accident and injury, there is no indi-
cation in the record that any of them told plaintiff Inter-
state Electric Company or its agents about such accident and 
injury. Further, no where in the record is there any indi-
cation that such persons were other than co-employees of 
defendant Inskeep. Consequently, under the provisions of 
Section 35-1-99, plaintiff Interstate Electric Company did 
not receive what the statute deems to be the equivalent of 
the required notice within the time period prescribed by 
the statute so as to avoid a 15% reduction in the award of 
defendant Inskeep. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT INSKEEP HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS FAILURE TO NOTIFY 
PLAINTIFF INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY OF THE ACCIDENT AND 
INJURY OR TO REPORT TO IT FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT WITHIN 
FORTY-EIGHT (48) HOURS AFTER THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT 
AND INJURY WAS NOT INTENDED TO MISLEAD OR PREJUDICE PLAIN -
TIFF INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY IN ITS DEFENSE OF HIS 
CLAIM AND DID NOT IN FACT MISLEAD OR PREJUDICE IT. 
Section 35-1-99 further provides that, irrespective 
of whether an injured employee fails to notify his employer 
-12-
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of the accident and injury or report to his employer for 
medical treatment within forty-eight (48) hours, the com-
pensation provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act shall 
not be reduced fifteen percent (15%) unless (1) such em-
ployee did not intend to mislead or prejudice his employer 
in making a defense and (2) his employer was not in fact 
mislead or prejudiced. 
In the case at bar, defendant Inskeep presented no 
testimony or other evidence that his failure to notify plain-
tiff Interstate Electric Company of the accident and injury 
or report to it for medical treatment within forty-eight 
(48) hours was not intended by him to mislead or prejudice 
it in its defense, and did not in fact mislead or prejudice 
it. This conclusion is amply supported by the Administrative 
Law Judge who heard this matter. In his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, he stated: 
One of the chief aims of this section (35-1-99) 
is to insure that the employer will not be 
prejudiced in his right to defend against 
these actions. In the instant matter there has 
been no showing of prejudice toward Interstate 
Electric Campany by the one day delay, and 
this writer feels that no amount of extrapola-
tion of the record will reveal such prejudice 
as to justify this harsh result. 
-13-
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The Administrative Law Judge clearly did not under-
stand that defendant Inskeep has the burden of showing that 
his failure to give notice to plaintiff Interstate Electric 
Company of the accident and injury or report to it for 
medical treatment within the prescribed period was not in-
tended to, and did not in fact, prejudice plaintiff Inter-
state Electric Company. In this regard, 3 
Workmen's Compensation Law 15-63 states: 
Once the record shows that the required 
notice has not been given, the fatal 
effect of this showing must be off-set 
Larson's 
by definite findings showing the kind of 
excuse or lack of prejudice that will 
satisfy the statute. The Commission can-
not remain silent on the issue of excuse 
or prejudice and leave appellate courts 
to infer that some excuse must be found. 
Moreover, the subsidiary findings of 
fact and evidence supporting the finding 
on lack of prejudice should be set forth, 
since this finding, like any other find-
ing of fact, must be supported by some 
evidence. 
In the absence of a specific statutory pro-
vision casting the burden of proof of pre-
judice upon the employer, which is to be 
found in some states, the burden is upon 
the employee to prove facts establishing 
an excuse once a failure to comply with the 
statute has been shown. 
-14-
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In Mistletoe Express Service and Reliance Insurance 
Company v. Bond and State Industrial Corp., 455 P.2d 90 (1969), 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the above rule. There, 
a widow filed a claim under the Oklahoma Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act alleging that she was entitled to benefits as a 
result of the death of her husband. The trial judge held 
that was entitled to such benefits, but made no mention of 
her failure to give formal written notice of her claim within 
thirty (30) days after his death. Upon appeal to the State 
Industrial Court, the order was modified so as to indicate 
that neithe~ her husband's employer or insurance carrier were 
prejudiced by such failure to give notice. Upon appeal to 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the award was vacated by it. 
At page 92, the Court stated: 
Since respondent did not have notice that 
decedent sustained an accident injury arising 
out of and in the course of his employment, 
the burden was on claimant to establish to 
the satisfaction of the State Industrial 
Court that respondent was not prejudiced 
thereby. See Title 85 O.S. 1961, Sec. 24, 
and Atkins v. Colonial Baking Company, Okl., 
287 P.2d 450. 
Neither claimant not respondent submitted 
evidence concerning whether respondent was 
or was not prejudiced for lack of notice. 
There being no evidence concerning this issue, 
the record will not support a finding that 
respondent was not prejudiced by claimant's 
failure to give notice. Inasmuch as the 
burden was upon claimant to prove respondent 
was not prejudiced by lack of notice, and 
claimant's entitlement to the award was de-
pendent upon her making such proof, the order 
awarding death benefits must be vacated. 
-15-
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Other than discussed above, Section 35-1-99 excuses 
an employee claiming injury from the requirement that he 
notify his employer of the accident and injury or report to 
him for medical treatment within forty-eight (48) hours only 
under circumstances wherein it is impossible for the employee 
to so report. However, as earlier indicated, the burden of 
showing such impossibility is upon the employee. In this 
case defendant Inskeep has introduced no evidence whatsoever 
that it was not possible for him to report to his employer 
within the forty-eight (48)-hour period prescribed by Section 
35-1-99. In fact, the record shows that defendant Inskeep ~i 
tinued to work for plaintiff Interstate Electric Company for 
approximately a week following the occurrence of the accident 
and injury. Hence, he clearly had ample opportunity to re-
port the accident and injury to plaintiff Interstate Electric 
Company or report to it for medical treatment prior to the 
expiration of the forty-eight (48)-hour period. Hence, not 
only has he failed to meet the burden of proof as to 
impossibility, but the record indicates that it was entirely. 
possible for him to report to his employer within the pre-
scribed time. 
In conclusion, Section 35-1-99 was intended to affo~ 
the employer of a person claiming injury the opportunity 
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to make early investigation of the facts of the claim so as 
to foreclose fraudulent claims, the opportunity to provide 
prompt and proper medical care, and the opportunity to 
remedy any defect or problem which may have contributed to 
or caused the accident and injury. For these reasons, 
Section 35-1-99 requires an employee who claims injury to 
notify his employer of the accident and injury or report 
to his employer for medical treatment within forty-eight 
(48) hours. In an effort to encourage the employee to take 
such action and fulfill the statutory purpose and intent, 
Section 35-1-99 further provides that if the employee claim-
ing injury fails to so report, the compensation which he would 
otherwise receive shall be reduced fifteen percent (15%) 
unless he did DlOtintend to prejudice and in fact did not 
prejudice his employer. 
In essence, Section 35-1-99 creates a presumption 
that an employer is in fact prejudiced by the failure of an 
employee claiming injury to notify him of the accident and 
injury or report to him for medical treatment within the 
period prescribed by the statute. This presumption, of 
course is rebuttable. However, the burden is upon the 
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employee to show that he did not intend to so prejudice his 
employer and that his employer was in fact not prejudiced. 
To hold otherwise would nullify the purpose and intent of 
Section 35-1-99 and severely hamper an employer's obligation 
to provide prompt and proper medical treatment to an in-
jured employee and to rectify the situation which caused or 
contributed to the injury in an effort to prevent similar 
accidents and injuries. 
SUMMARY 
The Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah should 
be vacated insofar as it fails to reduce the award of defen· 
dant Inskeep by fifteen percent (15%) for the following 
reasons: 
1. He did not notify plaintiff Interstate Electric 
Company of the accident and injury, or report to it for 
medical treatment,within forty-eight (48) hours after the 
occurrence. 
2. He did not meet the burden of showing that pla~· 
tiff Interstate Electric Company or its statutory agents knew 
of the accident and injury within the forty-eight (48) hour 
period prescribed by Section 35-1-99, nor did he show that 
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plaintiff Interstate Electric Company had knowledge of any 
assertion by him sufficient to enable it to investigate the 
accident and provide medical treatment for him. 
3. He did not meet the burden of showing that the 
notice which was given to his employer, defective because 
not given within the time prescribed by Section 35-1-99, 
was not intended to mislead and prejudice plaintiff Interstate 
Electric Company and in fact did not mislead and prejudice 
it. 
Wherefore, for the reasons set forth herein, plaintiffs 
respectfully pray that this Court vacate the award of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah insofar as it fails to reduce 
the award of defendant Michael E. Inskeep by fifteen percent 
(15%), as provided by Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 23rd day of June, 1978. 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
1 ,u/l;~ r4= 
W!Rf AM F. HANSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, two 
(2) copies of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Brief to A. Wally 
Sandack, attorney for defendant Inskeep, 370 East 500 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and to Robert B. Hansen, 
attorney for defendant Industrial Commission of Utah, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 23rd day of 
June, 1978. 
Attorney for plaintiffs 
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